By Olufemi Lawson
Today, Nigeria’s complex internal security environment requires more than the deployment of men, weapons and hardware. In an increasingly interconnected society where threats can emerge from communities, cyberspace, criminal networks and extremist cells, the effectiveness of any security architecture depends significantly on the quality of intelligence available to decision-makers and the speed with which that intelligence is transformed into preventive action.
It is against this background that the leadership approach of the Director-General of the Department of State Services (DSS), Adeola Oluwatosin Ajayi, deserves attention. Since assuming office in August 2024, Tosin Ajayi, as popular called, has increasingly projected an approach that places intelligence, prevention, collaboration and stakeholder engagement at the centre of internal security. Recent assessments of his tenure have particularly highlighted the Service’s emphasis on intelligence-led operations, stronger cooperation with other security agencies and engagement with communities as components of its evolving security philosophy.
The significance of this approach lies in understanding what intelligence actually means in modern security operations. Intelligence is not simply information gathered by security officers. It is the ability to obtain relevant information, analyse it, establish patterns, identify emerging threats and provide decision-makers with actionable knowledge before a security challenge becomes a full-blown crisis. For a country confronting terrorism, kidnapping, violent extremism, organised crime, separatist agitation, cyber threats and other forms of insecurity, prevention is inevitably more valuable than reacting after lives and property have already been lost.
Perhaps one of the most important elements of the Ajayi approach is the recognition that intelligence cannot be produced exclusively within the walls of security establishments. Communities themselves possess enormous amounts of information about their environments. Traditional rulers, religious leaders, youth organisations, transport workers, business owners, civil society organisations, journalists and ordinary citizens can often identify unusual activities or emerging tensions long before they become visible to government institutions. Ajayi has publicly emphasised the need for communities to become part of the country’s security architecture, recognising the simple reality that security agencies cannot be everywhere at the same time.
This is why citizens’ engagement should not be mistaken for public relations. Properly structured, it is itself a security instrument. A citizen who trusts the security establishment is more likely to provide useful information. A community that believes its concerns will be heard is more likely to cooperate with authorities. Conversely, where citizens regard security agencies exclusively as instruments of coercion, potentially valuable information may remain undisclosed until a situation deteriorates.
The second important dimension is collaboration among security institutions. Nigeria’s security challenges rarely respect institutional boundaries. A single threat may involve intelligence gathering by the DSS, policing by the Nigeria Police Force, military capabilities, border management, financial intelligence, cyber expertise and the involvement of state and local authorities. Recent reporting on the DSS under Ajayi has pointed to strengthened intelligence fusion and cooperation with the Armed Forces, Police and other agencies, with the objective of reducing duplication and improving situational awareness.
This collaborative philosophy represents an important departure from the assumption that one agency can independently solve every security problem. Modern security is increasingly an ecosystem. The agency that obtains the first piece of information may not be the institution that ultimately executes the response. What matters is whether the information gets to the right institution at the right time and whether the institutions involved can act together.
There is also a growing appreciation under Ajayi of the importance of the media as a partner in national security. In June 2026, the Nigerian Union of Journalists was reported to have recognised the DSS’s constructive engagement with media stakeholders, including efforts aimed at dialogue and addressing misinformation surrounding security issues. This is significant because secrecy and national security must coexist with responsible public communication. Security agencies cannot disclose operational intelligence, but neither should the absence of information automatically create an environment in which rumours and misinformation flourish.
A more open engagement with legitimate stakeholders can therefore serve two purposes simultaneously, protecting sensitive intelligence while giving the public enough credible information to understand security realities. This is particularly important in the age of social media, where unverified claims can travel faster than official responses.
The real test, however, is whether this philosophy continues to produce measurable improvements in prevention, intelligence sharing, response times, public confidence and respect for lawful procedures. No security institution should be judged merely by the sophistication of its rhetoric. Intelligence-led security must ultimately be reflected in better anticipation of threats, disruption of criminal networks, protection of citizens and the ability to prevent violence before it occurs.
There is also an important institutional lesson in the emerging approach. Security agencies should not operate as isolated islands. Internal security is a shared national responsibility, with government institutions, security agencies, communities, civil society, traditional institutions, the media and citizens all having defined roles. The state possesses the authority and professional capacity to protect citizens, while citizens provide the eyes, ears and contextual knowledge that can help security institutions understand what is happening at the grassroots.
The challenge is to build this partnership without compromising civil liberties, confidentiality or professional standards. Citizen engagement must not become an excuse for vigilantism or indiscriminate suspicion. Intelligence gathering must remain professional, evidence-based and subject to the law. Collaboration must not erase institutional accountability. And public trust must be earned through consistent conduct rather than demanded as an entitlement.
Nevertheless, the emerging emphasis on intelligence, prevention, collaboration and citizens’ engagement under Tosin Ajayi provides an important template for thinking about the future of Nigeria’s internal security architecture. It suggests that the strongest security system is not necessarily the one that is most visible after an incident, but the one capable of identifying danger early, mobilising the right institutions, working with communities and quietly preventing the incident from happening in the first place.
Nigeria’s security challenges are too complicated for a purely reactive model. The country needs security institutions that listen as much as they investigate, analyse as much as they deploy, collaborate as much as they command and prevent as much as they respond.
That is ultimately where the significance of an intelligence-driven and citizen-engaged security philosophy lies: the objective is not simply to fight insecurity after it emerges, but to build the intelligence and partnerships capable of stopping threats before they become tragedies.
May Nigeria continue to Succeed.
Comrade Olufemi Lawson is the Executive Director of the Centre for Public Accountability CPA and National Secretary of the Campaign for Democracy CD in Nigeria.